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WORKING GROUP REPORTS & AGENDAS
REPORT OF WORKING GROUP #1
Tami Scarola
Working Group number 1 organized its discussion into four parts:
an overview of the paper by the author; comment on the paper by the
group members; a general examination of the meaning of pluralism;
and preparation of the agenda. Most of the discussion centered
around the paper, but the agenda does not reflect that focus. The
agenda was a debated compromise, which speaks in general terms.
Howard Lesnick described his article, The Religious Lawyer in a
PluralistSociety, as a normative, rather than a doctrinal, approach to
the issue. The article sets out three qualities which all religions share:
obligation, integration, and transcendence, and discusses the implications of integrating attorneys' religion and the norms of their practice.
Religious differentiations are currently treated as merely contingent
characteristics, which presume that all lawyers should act very much
the same. Thus, religion is regarded as just one of many idiosyncrasies
of the individual lawyer. Professor Lesnick then explains that a religious lawyer should not refrain from making decisions based on her
subjective religious beliefs. A lawyer should not, however, impose her
view on a vulnerable client such as in the Tennessee example.
The entire group commented on Professor Lesnick's article. Some
expressed concern that the dominant view of a religious lawyer's
scruples could create an "adversarial shield" between the attorneys'
own religious values and their practice. Thus, attorneys would be encouraged to claim no responsibility for the client's acts. The group
also discussed whether the definition of religion was too broad.
A discussion then ensued concerning the lack of recognition of the
client's spirituality in the analysis. The question was: How does an
attorney counsel a client whose own spirituality is as important as the
attorney's? One member of the group decided the answer depends
on the way one defines spirituality. Two general answers were proposed to resolve the question of conflicting spiritualities: (1) an attorney would expect the legal system to let her off the case-perhaps by
deeming the attorney disabled from providing effective representation; or (2) if the attorney could not withdraw, she should find a way
to share her moral convictions in a way which respects the client's ability to make the decision. The attorney must share the client's sense of
right and wrong so the client can understand the morality of the issue.
One member disagreed with these two answers, and argued that
religious scriptures should be used in every decision. This member
argued that one should not water down the word of God just because
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it hurts other people's feelings. A third answer to the question suggested that the attorney has a duty to preach her convictions and tell
the client that what she is doing is wrong or right. This is considered
the "Christian Witness" perspective. Other members argued it is not
in the collective good for someone to preach or "bear witness" to a
vulnerable client.
The leader of the group then offered a bankruptcy hypothetical.
Essentially, a man is going bankrupt and has an insurance policy
which he is not sure is good in the event of suicide. The man calls his
attorney. The attorney infers that the man intends to commit suicide
and knows that the suicide will not void the insurance policy. What
should the attorney do? Five answers were offered: (1) manipulate
the client by delaying; (2) tell the client the attorney cannot answer
the question; (3) call the police after the client leaves the attorney's
office; (4) counsel the client on moral grounds; or (5) give full disclosure. The fifth answer was termed the "Disclosure Model" from securities law and explained that the attorney must lay everything out
on the table for the client to ultimately make the decision. It was
argued that this is the best alternative because the attorney is protected. A counter argument is that neutral advice is wrong because
that is not God's teaching. Others believed that if the attorney takes a
gentle stance on the issue it would be ethical to give directive moral
advice. Once the attorney becomes combative, however, the advice
has crossed the line of ethical action. One participant then stressed
that law schools must teach students this non-combative approach.
Becoming aware of the danger of imposing the attorney's beliefs on
the client is the first step in avoiding the problem.
The discussion then turned to the question of whether a lawyer is a
neutral agent or the client's agent. Underlying this conflict is an attorney's religious perspective. Religious attorneys feel there is a "prior
claim on them" and, therefore, they are required to split themselves
off from this other claim before they practice law. Thus, the characterization of an attorney must be clarified. Professor Lesnick's idea of
"integration" may solve this conflict. Integration is the balance between this "prior claim" and the attorney's practice. One member argued, however, that those who do not have a religion do not need the
"integration." A counter argument was made that those without religion have morals which must be integrated.
The article comments were summarized as: (1) an attorney can
bring her religious self into the attorney client relationship; (2) the
legal culture and the self can be integrated; (3) legitimizing the lawyer's self aids the common good; and (4) religious pluralism must be
considered. The group then moved on to a discussion of religious
pluralism.
The group focused on the importance of being aware of religious
pluralism. If one makes a statement in religiously diverse company,

1998]

REPORT OF WORKING GROUP #1

1587

that person should recognize that the different reactions may be
evoked by such a statement. Thus, one could look at pluralism focusing on differences, but the group stressed commonalities. A person in
mixed company could avoid a problem by focusing on consensual
value statements, rather than subjective statements. Attorneys should
build common ground, while keeping in mind the differences, as the
solution to pluralism. One member suggested the ground be built on
values. Another member felt this problem is rare because when clients choose attorneys they frequently choose someone with the same
beliefs, thus avoiding a conflict. One participant stressed that there
are few religious attorneys today and thus less suspicion that the attorney is bringing religious perspectives to work.
There was disagreement over whether a common ground could be
found. One participant felt the political model should be followed in
the practice of law. Other members were concerned that there is no
end to the definition of religion and thus a common ground is difficult
to build without a clear understanding of religion. One member
pointed out that to define religion would be to violate the Establishment Clause of the Constitution. The group summarized these issues
as: Should a pluralist society acting through norms of legal culture
view as a public good the religiously grounded scruples of attorneys'?;
and, What about scruples which are not religiously grounded?
The group then discussed when religious convictions can be brought
into the practice. The group decided an attorney cannot use a client
as a means to a religious end. However, if there is a trust relationship,
then the attorney can give such advice. The group also decided that
the attorney must withdraw or seek leave of court to do so, if the
client decides she no longer wants the attorney's services. The agenda
was initially formulated as a detailed "to do" list for schools, the profession, and religious community. Because the group had so much difficulty agreeing on the wording and content of the list, open-ended
questions were created to address the main points. The group, therefore, decided that rather than recommending a rule change, they
would suggest further research be conducted on the viability of a new
rule, which would follow Professor Lesnick's argument in his paper.
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